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ABSTRACT 
 
The Palestinian government made an ad hoc declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court in 2009. Three years later, the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court rejected the declaration. It decided that it is not within the 
competence of the Office of the Prosecutor, but up to the United Nations Secretary General 
or the Assembly of States Parties, to determine the Statehood of Palestine. This research 
paper analyses the 2009 Palestinian ad hoc declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court and the decision of the Office of the Prosecutor. It critically 
examines the legal basis of the Palestinian ad hoc declaration, the Procedure followed by 
the Prosecutor and the Statehood issue of Palestine. The study concludes that although 
there are enough supporting evidences to hold the Palestinian ad hoc declaration 
acceptable, the approach adopted and the conclusion reached by the Prosecutor are highly 
questionable in light of the Rome Statute and Conventional law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On 21 January 2009, the Palestinian government submitted an ad hoc declaration 
recognising the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for ‘identifying, 
prosecuting and judging the authors and accomplices of acts committed on the territory of 
Palestine since 1 July 2002’. On 3 April 2012, the then Chief Prosecutor of the ICC rejected 
the declaration asserting the controversial nature of the Palestine Statehood and concluding 
that the Rome Statute grants no authority to the Prosecutor of the Court to interpret the 
term ‘State’ in the Rome Statute.  
The purpose of the thesis at hand is to analyse the Palestinian ad hoc declaration and the 
decision of the Prosecutor. In doing so it addresses the legal basis of the Palestine ad hoc 
declaration and examines the procedure followed and the conclusion reached by the 
Prosecutor in rejecting the declaration. It, in addition, addresses the impact of the non-
member observer State status of Palestine in the UN and its impact with regard to the 
relationship between Palestine and the ICC 
The first chapter of this thesis illuminates the historical and political background of the 
Israel-Palestine conflict. It addresses the situation in Gaza, Operation Cast Lead and the 
reaction of the UN Human Rights Council towards the operation. 
The second chapter deals with the Palestinian ad hoc declaration, focusing on the forms of 
jurisdiction and their applicability to the Palestine ad hoc declaration. It also discusses 
practical cases of ad hoc declaration and issues of retroactivity. 
The decision of the Prosecutor is the main focus of the third chapter. The rejection of the 
declaration is mainly due to the lack of an established procedure to determine the 
interpretation of the term ‘State’. Thus, the procedure adopted by the Prosecutor in 
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deciding to reject the Palestinian declaration and the Statehood issue of Palestine are 
critically analysed. 
As many things have changed after the rejection of the ad hoc declaration, the fourth 
chapter addresses the recent developments which are strongly related to Palestine and the 
ICC. It discusses the observer State status of Palestine and its impact, the recent Israeli 
military operation against Gaza, and provides a way forward to dispense justice for the 
victims of the Israel-Palestine conflict.  
The final and last chapter provides concluding remarks and recommendations.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT 
 
1.1 The Roots of the Israel-Palestinian Conflict 
The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the most highly opinionated conflicts in the world. 
Even the name and the connotation attached to it are contentious. To label the conflict as 
an Israeli conflict or a Palestinian conflict would make the discussion pro-Israel or pro-
Palestine respectively. Since it is less disputable to refer to the conflict as the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, this labelling is used hereunder. 
The Israel-Palestine conflict can be traced back to the turn of the 20th century.1 Back then 
Britain had a significant role. Under the Balfour declaration of 1917, Britain declared its 
complete support for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in 
Palestine.2 It was also the mandate power in Palestine and was responsible to apply the 
terms of the mandate which were the direct replicas of the Balfour declaration.3 The British 
mandate in Palestine lasted from 1923 to 1948, and was immediately followed by the 1948-
1949 Arab-Israel war which brought the broad dimension of the conflict into existence.4 
After this war, the land which was historically part of the Ottoman Empire was split up into 
the land of Israel, the Gaza strip and the West Bank.5 The partition was made in an effort to 
establish a Jewish State which comprises all the Jews living in diaspora in many parts of the 
                                                          
1
    Matthews E The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Parallel Discourses (2011) 5. 
2
    Gilbert M An overwhelmingly Jewish State -From the Balfour Declaration to the Palestine mandate  (2011)  
23. 
3
    Gilbert M (2011) 23. 
4
   Dowty A Israel/Palestine 2ed (2008) 2.Katten V From Coexistence to Conquest; International Law and the 
origins of the Arab-Israel Conflict 1891-1949 (2009)8. 
5
    Benin J & Hajjar L ‘Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict: A premier’ 2003 MERIP 5-8. 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
world.6  This effort, however, created the trouble spot for competing territorial and political 
interests that in numerous occasions culminated into re-occurring conflicts for many 
decades until today. 
The conflict, originally, is not a conflict of ethnic hatred nor a conflict rooted in religious 
issues.7 The key areas of contention for the conflict are the Israeli settlements, border 
disputes, control of Jerusalem, water resources, and freedom of movement of Palestinians.8 
Deducting other dimensions added to the conflict over the years, the Israel-Palestine 
conflict is basically a clash between Zionism (Jewish national movement) with the purpose 
to create a Jewish State and a Palestinian national movement which claims a sovereign 
Palestine State.9  
Proponents of Israel argue that the cause of the conflict is the refusal of the Arabs and the 
Palestinians to recognize the legitimate existence of the State of Israel while the supporters 
of Palestine consider the denial of the right to self-determination of the people of Palestine 
as the core issue of the conflict.10 Whichever approach is taken, the essence of the 
contention lies in the antagonistic claims over the same piece of land by the two nations. 
The central focus of the conflict shifted to the occupied territories of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip in the 1970’s.11 These territories, inhabited at that time by more than one million 
Palestinians, were conquered by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War.12 When all the diplomatic 
efforts failed and the occupation persisted, the issues related to the occupied territories 
                                                          
6
   Benin & Hajjar (2003) 5-8. 
7
   Dowty A (2008) 2. 
8
   Shlaim A ‘The Middle East: The origins of Arab-Israeli Wars’  in Woods N (ed) Explaining International 
Relations Since 1945 (1996) 219-21.   
9
    Dowty A (2008) 4. 
10
   Dowty A (2008) 4. 
11
   Tessar M A History of the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (1994) 465. 
12
   Tessar M A (1994) 465. 
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became the crucial dimension of the conflict. It is in these territories that the two nations 
confront one another on a daily basis, resulting in one of the bloodiest areas in the world.13 
The level of violence and the extent of violations of human rights and humanitarian law 
committed due to this conflict have captured the attention of the international community, 
resulting in broad arrays of views, opinions and possible alternative solutions to the 
problem. Despite the countless negotiations and peace agreements, the two nations have 
failed to make peace with each other.14 Among the countless but ineffective peace 
processes and agreements, the Oslo Peace Accords were considered most significant from 
various angles. 
1.2 A Ray of Hope: The Oslo Peace Accords 
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-government Arrangements (Oslo I)15 and ‘the 
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II),16 
together known as the Oslo Peace Accords, were the first historic attempt for peace in the 
Israel-Palestine region.17 The accords were signed in the aftermath of the 1993 Gulf war in 
1993 and 1995 respectively. These American-sponsored agreements18 derived their 
legitimacy from Resolution 24219 and 33820 of the UN Security Council which called for a 
                                                          
13
   Tessar M (1994) 465. See also Dowty A (2008)4. 
14
   Matthews E (2011) 5-8. 
15
   Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangement (1993). 
16
   Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995) 
17
   Shlaim A ‘The rise and fall of the Oslo peace process’ in Fawcett L (ed) International Relations of the Middle 
East (2005) 241. 
18
   Shlaim A (2005) 241-61. 
19
   The UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) (Also known as the "Land for peace" Resolution). 
20
   The UN Security Council Resolution 338 (1973). 
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peaceful settlement to the Israel-Palestine conflict through negotiations and territorial 
compromise.21 
The Oslo accords laid down the withdrawal of the Israeli military from Gaza and the transfer 
of power to ‘authorized’ Palestinians.22 It was agreed that Israel will maintain responsibility 
for foreign affairs and external defence.23 The agreements were aimed to end Israel’s rule 
over the West Bank and Gaza.24 But they were silent on the essential aspects such as the 
border issues, the Israeli settlements and the status of Jerusalem.25 
Oslo I and II were signed and sealed by the then Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, and 
ex-chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Yasser Arafat.26 Arafat confirmed 
that the agreement marked PLO’s recognition of Israel’s right to peace and security and the 
organisation’s acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338. Israel also recognized 
the Palestinians as people with political rights and the PLO as the representative of the 
former. In the Oslo accords, both sides accepted the partition of the territory and arguably 
the prospect of a two State solution.27 
Despite being acclaimed as a historic breakthrough for peace in the Middle East, the Oslo 
agreement later proved to be fruitless. This was primarily due to its failure to address the 
core issues of the conflict, mainly, the right of return to the refugees of the first Arab-Israel 
war, the borders of Palestine, the West Bank and Gaza Jewish settlements and the status of 
                                                          
21
   Mendes E Statehood and Palestine for the purpose of Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute: A Contrary Perspective 
(1989) 22-23. 
22
   Art. I, The Oslo Accords II.Shlaim A (2005) 241-61. 
23
   Art. XII, The Oslo Accords II. 
24
   Art. 1, The Oslo Accords II. 
25
   Shlaim A (2005) 258. 
26
   Shlaim A (2005) 241-61. 
27
   Shlaim A (2005) 241-61. 
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Jerusalem.28 Israel also defaulted on its side of the bargain and continued settlement in the 
West Bank.29 On their part, Palestinians breached the short-lived fragile peace by resorting 
to violence.30 These causes turned the historic deal into another futile peace agreement. 
1.3 The Gaza Situation 
According to the Oslo Accords, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank form a unitary territory.31 
Although referred as such, the two territories are two separate lands. Throughout the 
occupation, Israel enforced an economic and political isolation policy on the occupied 
territories.32 The closure policy which involved the complete closure of border crossings was 
initially imposed as a form of collective punishment against Palestinians for the rocket 
attacks against Israel.33 This policy which bans Gaza inhabitants from leaving the territory 
and from exporting or importing goods, including primary ones, has been continuously 
imposed, especially, since Hamas took power in 2007.34 
The closure has devastated the socio-economic situation of Gaza and has resulted in 
humanitarian crises.35 As explained by Meloni, the closure has infringed various human 
rights and humanitarian law principles.36 It has affected the basis of the right to life and 
freedom of movement. The UN Fact Finding Mission established in 2009 after the so-called 
                                                          
28
   Shlaim A (2005)246. 
29
   Shlaim A (2005) 241-61. 
30
   Shlaim A (2005) 241-61. 
31
   Art. XI, The Oslo Accord (II). Meloni C ‘The Gaza Situation as a Test Bench for International Justice’ 2012 JICJ 
164. 
32
   Meloni C (2012) 164. 
33
   Meloni C (2012) 164. 
34
   Meloni C (2012) 164. 
35
   Meloni C (2012) 164. 
36
   Meloni C (2012) 164. 
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Operation Cast Lead (see section 1.4 below) has also concluded that the closure amounts to 
crimes against humanity in the form of persecution.37 
1.4 Operation Cast Lead 
The Israel-Palestine history is filled with regular unrests, clashes and armed conflicts. With 
regard to the 2009 Palestine declaration and the ICC, Operation Cast Lead is most crucial. 
This military operation was conducted for 22 days starting from 27 December 2008.38 Of the 
casualties and destructions that happened to civilians and civilian objects in the history of 
the conflict, the one witnessed during this operation was ranked as one of the gravest. It 
was officially explained by Israel that the unrelenting bomb attacks on the Gaza Strip were 
conducted to stop the indiscriminate rocket attacks by Hamas and Hamas affiliated armed 
groups.39 
Cast Lead was originally planned to have three stages. However, only two phases of the 
operation were implemented. The first stage was the air operation which began on 27 
December 2008 and the second phase, which incorporated limited ground attacks, was 
launched on 3 January 2009.40 Hamas fired 600 rockets into Israel and Israel used 80 
warplanes to carry out the surprise air strike.41 
                                                          
37
   Report of the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ‘Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied 
Arab Territories’ (2009). 
38
   Amnesty International, ‘Israel/Gaza: Operation ‘Cast Lead: 22 days of death and destruction’ (2009) 1. 
39
   Amnesty International, (2009) 1. 
40
   Cohen & White Hamas in combat: The military performance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement 
(2009) x. 
41
   Cohen & White (2009) 2. 
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The operation was subjected to various investigative reports by  Amnesty International,  
Human Rights Watch, a fact finding Committee of the League of Arab States and a fact 
finding Mission of  the UN established by the Human Rights Council.42 
According to the 2009 Amnesty International publication, the operation resulted in 1 400 
deaths of Palestinians including 300 children.43 From the Israeli side nine soldiers were killed 
during the operation in Gaza and four civilians were killed by rockets fired into Southern 
Israel.44 In total, 83 percent of those killed during the operation were civilians.45 It was also 
documented that houses, hospitals, factories and places of worship were attacked without 
military necessity.46 
Due to the direct and indiscriminate targeting of civilians and civilian objects, a large part of 
Gaza was ruined, leaving thousands of people homeless. The Operation was also 
condemned for the prohibited means and methods of warfare employed and for many 
other international humanitarian law violations committed throughout the attack.47 
1.5 The Reaction of the UN Human Rights Council and the Goldstone Report  
To investigate crimes committed during Operation Cast Lead, the UN Human Rights Council 
established the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict on April 2009. The 
Fact Finding Mission was mandated ‘to investigate all violations of international law and 
international humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context 
of the military Operation that was conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 
                                                          
42
   Dugard J ‘Palestine and the ICC: Institutional Failure or Bias?’ 2013 JICJ 567. 
43
   Amnesty international (2009) 1. 
44
   Meloni C (2012) 166. 
45
   Al Haq‘Operation Cast Lead: A Statistical Analysis’ (2009) 3. 
46
   Meloni C (2012) 166. 
47
   AMICC Communication to the ICC Concerning the Situation in Gaza (2009). 
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2008 to 18 January 2009’.48 After conducting an objective assessment of the cause and the 
context of the situation, the Mission came up with a 600 page report which was named 
after its South African Chairman, Judge Richard Goldstone.49 
The report emphasised that the military Operation is a continuation of the policies aimed to 
pursue Israel’s political aim in relation to Gaza and the occupied territories, and that many 
of these policies result in or are based on violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian laws.50 
The report concluded that although civilian lives may unfortunately be a collateral damage 
in an armed conflict, in this Operation, there are indications that the attacks were premised 
on a deliberate violation of the principle of proportionality. The report also concluded that 
the objectives of the Operation, as stated by the Israeli government, do not justify the facts 
ascertained by the Fact Finding Mission. The damage caused revealed that the basic 
principles of the laws of armed conflict, particularly, the principle of distinction and 
precaution were not taken into consideration in planning and conducting the attacks. 
The Operation, as per the Goldstone report, is evident to be the continuation of the policy 
of blockage and that amounts to intentionally inflicted collective punishment against the 
people of Gaza. The effect of the policy of the blockade, as indicated in the report, coupled 
with the military Operation and the manner in which it was conducted has resulted in 
                                                          
48
   Report of the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ‘Human rights in Palestine and other occupied 
Arab territories’ (2009).See also Meloni C (2012) 166. 
49
   Meloni C (2012) 166. Richard Goldstone worked as a judge in the Constitutional Court of South Africa and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
50
   Report of the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (2009) 405-6. 
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unprecedented long-term damage to the population, its development and the prospect of 
recovery.51 
Though numerous allegations of violations of human rights were directed against Israel, the 
UN Fact Finding Mission has concluded that both Israel and Hamas have committed 
violations of the laws and customs of armed conflict.52 Therefore, the mission 
recommended the establishment of individual criminal responsibility and proposed different 
mechanisms to ensure accountability for the crimes committed by both parties to the 
conflict during the Operation. First, it demanded prosecution by the State of Israel; second, 
it demanded other States to prosecute the most responsible individuals by exercising 
universal jurisdiction; and third, it called upon the UN Security Council to refer the situation 
to the ICC Prosecutor if Israel and the authorities of the Gaza strip failed to conduct 
investigations on the matter. 
The Israeli government did not ignore the calls to undertake domestic investigations. It 
investigated numerous allegations of military misconduct of ‘foot soldiers’, but none of the 
investigations were directed against those who were planning and ordering the operation.53 
The Israelis’ military legal system has a contestable relationship with the government, which 
usually gives rise to impartiality concerns.54 This coupled with the lack of political will, did 
not allow investigations and prosecutions which are in line with the international law 
standards.55 These problems necessitate a judicial forum beyond the borders of Israel.56 
                                                          
51
   Report of the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (2009) 405-7. 
52
   Report of the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (2009) 405-6. 
53
   Murray D ‘Investigating the Investigations: A Comment on the UN Committee of Experts Monitoring of the 
Goldstone Process’ in Meloni& Tognoni (eds) Is There a Court for Gaza? A Test Bench for International 
Justice (2012) 157. 
54
   Weill S ‘The Follow Up to the Goldstone Report and its Legal impact in Israel and beyond’ in Meloni 
&Tognoni (eds) Is There a Court for Gaza? A Test Bench for International Justice (2012) 117-18. 
55
   Meloni &Tognoni (eds) (2012) 118. 
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On the Palestinian side, due to the political split, the government of the Gaza strip and the 
government of West Bank opened two parallel investigative procedures. Each side created 
an investigative commission, but ultimately no investigations and prosecutions were 
initiated.57 
On March 2011, the Human Rights Council, through Resolution 16/32, urged the UN General 
Assembly to submit the Goldstone Report to the UN Security Council so that the Council 
could take appropriate actions, including a referral of the situation to the ICC as per Article 
13 (b) of the ICC Statute.58 Until the time of writing, the Security Council did not refer this 
situation to the ICC or pursue any other alternative accountability mechanism. 
1.6 Palestine and the ICC 
Palestine and Israel are not States Parties to the ICC. Hence, the Court has no automatic 
jurisdiction over the alleged crimes. To give the Court jurisdiction over alleged crimes 
committed in Palestine, on 21 January 2009, the Palestinian government lodged an ad hoc 
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. 
On April 2012, the Office of The Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC decided that the declaration 
could not provide the intended result due to the unsettled question of Palestine’s 
Statehood.59 The then Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, noted that the 
Statute has not granted his Office the authority to define the word ‘State’ for Article 12 (3) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
56
   Meloni &Tognoni (eds) (2012)118. 
57
   Meloni &Tognoni (eds) (2012) 118. 
58
   Meloni &Tognoni (eds) (2012) 158. 
59
   The Decision of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC on the 2009 Palestinian Declaration (2013). See also 
Zimmermann A ‘Palestine and the International Criminal Court Quo Vadis; Reach and limits of declarations 
under Article 12(3)’ (2013) 11 JICJ 304. 
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purposes and further provided that the issue shall be determined by the UN Secretary 
General or the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC.60 
After Palestine obtained the UN non-member observer State status in 2012, recent updates 
from the Office of the Prosecutor indicate that Palestine could accede to the Rome Statute 
or submit an ad hoc declaration under Article 12 (3) of the Statute.61 The Palestinian 
government has also been urged by many to accede to the Rome Statute or to lodge a new 
ad hoc declaration, especially, after the recent Israeli military operation in Gaza named 
Operation Protective Edge.62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
60
    The Decision of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC on the 2009 Palestinian Declaration (2013). 
61
   The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2013) 53. A similar Statement 
was also published in the September 2014 Press release by Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda. 
62
   Joint Letter to President Abbas on the International Criminal Court, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/08/joint-letter-president-abbas-international-criminal-Court (accessed 
7 October 2014). Amnesty International ‘Israel/OPT: The International Criminal Court must investigate war 
crimes’ (2014) 1. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE PALESTINE AD HOC DECLARATION 
 
With the aspiration to create the territorial or nationality nexus necessary for the ICC to 
obtain jurisdiction, the Palestine Justice Minister, representing the government of Palestine, 
submitted an ad hoc declaration to the Registrar of the Court on 21 January 2009. The 
declaration which was submitted three days after Operation Cast Lead recognized the 
jurisdiction of the ICC for ‘identifying, prosecuting and judging the authors and accomplices 
of acts committed on the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002’.63 It was made based on 
Article 12 (3) of the ICC and further indicated the willingness of the government to 
cooperate as per Chapter IX of the Statue.64 
This chapter discusses the legal basis of the Palestinian ad hoc declaration. The first section 
addresses the other means to trigger the jurisdiction of the Court. The Practices of the ICC 
with regard to Cote D’Ivoire, Uganda and Ukraine ad hoc declarations are also reviewed. In 
relation to the Palestinian declaration, the various elements of the ad hoc jurisdiction are 
also examined.  
2.1 Possible Jurisdictional Alternates to the ICC  
International law has not advanced to a stage where States are legally obliged to be 
members of a certain international organisation.65 The current legal system in the 
international arena, to a larger extent, is still State based, consensual and decentralised in 
                                                          
63
   Palestinian Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (2009). See also 
Zimmermann A (2013) 314. 
64
   The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002). 
65
   Stahn & Sluiter (eds) (2009) 115-16. 
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nature.66 For the same reason the ICC does not enjoy a universal jurisdiction. The Court can 
only exercise jurisdiction if the relevant national criminal Courts are unwilling or unable to 
conduct a genuine investigation and prosecution (principle of complementarity).67 Aside 
from situations arising on the basis of Article 124,68 the Court has compulsory and automatic 
jurisdiction if the conditions set under Article 12 are satisfied. This provision confers 
territorial and personality jurisdictions to the Court, enabling the prosecution of nationals of 
a State Party and the prosecution of crimes committed on the territory of the same. 
The jurisdiction of the ICC can be triggered in three different mechanisms; 
 A State Party refers a situation within subject matter jurisdiction of the Court to the 
Prosecutor,69  
 The UN Security Council makes a referral of a situation to the Prosecutor 
notwithstanding the nationality of the accused or where the crime is committed70 or 
  With the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorisation, the Prosecutor initiates an 
investigation on his own initiative (proprio motu power of the Prosecutor).71  
Except Security Council referrals, all mechanisms that trigger jurisdiction under the Rome 
Statute presume a State which is a Party to the Statute. However, both parties to the Israel-
Palestine conflict are non-Parties to the ICC Statute. This excludes the jurisdiction of the 
Court from the nationals and territories of both parties. Due to the veto power of the United 
States, it is also highly unlikely that the UN Security Council would refer the situation in 
Palestine to the ICC Prosecutor 
                                                          
66
   Stahn & Sluiter (eds) (2009) 116. 
67
   Par. 4 & 6 of the Preamble and Art. 17(1) (a)), The ICC Statute. 
68
   This provision, entitled, ‘Transitional Provision’, allows an acceding State to make reservations on the 
jurisdiction of the Court on the categories of crime indicated under Article 8 of the Statute for a period of 
seven years starting from the date of accession of the acceding State. 
69
   Art. 13 (a) & 14, The ICC Statute. Werle G Principles of International Criminal Law  2 ed (2009) 91. 
70
   Art. 13 (b), The ICC Statute. Werle G (2009) 91. 
71
   Art. 13 (c) & 15, The ICC Statute, Werle G (2009) 91. 
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2.2 Ad Hoc Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: Article 12(3) 
With the aim to expand the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, Article 12(3) envisaged a 
means that enables non-signatory States to accept the Court’s jurisdiction on a temporary 
basis without the necessity of acceding to the Statute.72 The third paragraph of Article 12 
entitled ‘preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction’, stipulates; 
‘If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under 
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The 
accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in 
accordance with Part 9.’73 
 
Article 12 (3) is aimed to effect universal participation of the Statute. It is a provision in 
which the consent of States is contemplated on a case by case basis and one through which 
non-Party States would engage themselves with the Court whenever they find it 
necessary.74 
2.2.1 Practices of the ICC with Regard to Ad Hoc Declarations  
 
Apart from the Palestinian ad hoc declaration, three States have accepted the jurisdiction of 
the Court on the basis of Article 12 (3). The first declaration was made by Cote D’Ivoire 
which was followed by the Ugandan declaration. Ukraine made the latest Article 12 (3) 
declaration on April 2014. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
72
   Art. 12(3), The ICC Statute. See also Schabas W (2007) 78. 
73
   Art. 12(3), The ICC Statute. 
74
   Triffterer O (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court-Observers’ Notes, 
Articles by Article (2 ed) (2008) 548. 
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2.2.1.1  Situation in Cote D’Ivoire 
Cote D’Ivoire signed the Rome Statute on November 1998. However, it did not ratify the 
Statute until February 2013.75 In a declaration dated 18 April 2003, the Cote D’Ivoire 
government accepted the jurisdiction of the Court as per Article 12(3) of the Statute with 
regard to crimes committed on its territory since 19 September 2002.76 
In accordance with Article 15 of the Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber while deciding on the 
authorisation of investigation on the Cote D’Ivoire situation recognised that the Court has 
jurisdiction over the alleged crimes committed in the declaring State’s territory since 16 
September 2002.77 Although such is the case, the indictments issued by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber covered situations that occurred in 2010 and 2011.  
In addition, the Appeals Chamber, in a judgment dated 12 December 2012 noted that 
acceptance of jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12 (3) is not limited to a specific scenario or 
situation unless such is stipulated in the letter of declaration.78 Thus, as the Court Stated, all 
crimes under the Statute which are committed even after the declaration was lodged shall 
also be considered to be covered by the ad hoc jurisdiction.  
From the judgment of the Chambers on the Cote D’Ivoire declaration, it appears that Article 
12 (3) declarations follow the same procedure as ‘proprio muto’ cases and are endowed 
with both retroactive and prospective effects. 
 
 
                                                          
75
   Member States of the Rome Statute, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/States%20parties/african%20States/Pages/Cote_d_Ivoire.aspx (accessed 31 August 
2014). 
76
   Zimmermann A (2013) 310. 
77
   Pre-Trial Chamber III  (2011) Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Cote D’Ivoire ICC-02/11-3 x 15. 
78
   The Prosecutor v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo(2013) ICC-02/11-01/11 OA 2. Judgment on the appeal of Mr 
Laurent Koudou Gbagbo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on jurisdiction and stay of the 
proceedings. 
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2.2.1.2 Situation in Uganda  
Uganda submitted its instrument of ratification on 14 June 2002, which entered into force 
for Uganda on 1 September 2002 (two months after the Rome Statute entered into force). 
When the OTP requested arrest warrant for Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord Resistance 
Army, it referred to crimes allegedly committed between 1 July 2002 and 4 September 
2002, i.e., a time when the Statute has not yet came into force in respect of Uganda.79 In 
doing so, the OTP attached the Ugandan acceptance of jurisdiction made on 27 February 
2004 in which Uganda accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction for crimes committed since the coming 
into force of the Statute. Nevertheless, in a decision passed on 27 September 2005, the II 
Pre-Trial Chamber issued a warrant of arrest for Joseph Kony ignoring the temporal scope of 
the declaration.80 
2.2.1.3 Situation in Ukraine  
On 17 April 2014, Ukraine submitted a declaration pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Rome 
Statute accepting the jurisdiction of the Court over crimes allegedly committed on its 
territory ‘from 21 November 2013 to 22 February 2014’.81 The declaration cited high-level 
government officials who are allegedly responsible for the crimes committed during the 
anti-government protests in Kiev.82 Consequent to the receipt of the declaration, the OTP 
opened a preliminary examination of the situation so as to confirm whether the criteria 
prescribed under Article 53(1) of the Statute, i.e. issues of jurisdiction and admissibility as 
                                                          
79
   Zimmermann A (2013) 309-10. 
80
   Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended 27 September 2005, 
Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-01/05), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 27 September 2005. 
81
   The ICC on Ukraine available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20Court/office%20of%20the%20Prosecutor/comm%20and%
20ref/pe-ongoing/ukraine/pages/ukraine.aspx (accessed 31 August 2014).  
82
   Ukraine accepts ICC jurisdiction available at http://ciccglobaljustice.wordpress.com/2014/04/18/ukraine-
accepts-icc-jurisdiction/ (accessed 31 August 2014). 
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well as ‘interest of justice’, are satisfied. To date, the OTP did not publish its decision on the 
preliminary examination. 
2.3 The Legal Regime of Ad hoc Declarations 
Ever since the Rome conference, the legal regime for the acceptance of ad hoc jurisdiction 
has been controversial.83 The manner in which this jurisdiction is meant to be approached is 
uncertain since the provision remained undetermined by the drafters.84 The ad hoc 
acceptance of jurisdiction contemplated by this provision only requires a non-Party State to 
lodge a declaration to the Registrar of the Court. By doing so, the non-Party State 
demonstrates its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction with regard to ‘a crime in question’. 
Once a declaration for the acceptance of jurisdiction is made, the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction over the accepting State’s nationals who allegedly committed crime(s) within 
jurisdiction of the Court anywhere or another State’s national who allegedly committed a 
crime on the territory of the accepting State. 
Article 12 (3) is different from other referrals with regard to its effect to activate jurisdiction. 
When a situation is referred by the Security Council or States Parties, it has the power to 
trigger jurisdiction. However, the language and drafting history of Article 12 and 13 reflects 
the drafters’ intention to come up with a provision that symbolises the declaring State’s 
consent to the jurisdiction of the Court, which could have effect only if it satisfies the 
requirements set under Article 15 of the Statute.85 Hence, unlike the other types of 
referrals, a referral under Article 12 (3) has no effect of triggering jurisdiction on its own. 
 
                                                          
83
   Triffterer O (2 ed) (2008) 548. 
84
   Triffterer O (2 ed) (2008) 548. 
85
   Art. 12 (2), Art.13(c) and Art. 15, The ICC Statute. Schabas W (2007) 81. See also Schabas W The 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2010) 289. 
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2.4 Elements of Ad hoc Jurisdiction 
Similar to other mechanisms that provide jurisdiction to the Court, ad hoc jurisdictions raise 
discussions of subject matter, temporal, territorial and personal jurisdictions. The following 
section discusses the scope of the elements of an ad hoc jurisdiction with regard to the 
Palestinian ad hoc declaration. 
2.4.1 Subject Matter Jurisdiction for the Palestinian Ad hoc Declaration 
 
The jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to the core crimes contained in the Statute, which are 
the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.86 
These grave crimes of ‘most serious concern to the international community’87 are defined 
under Articles 6, 7 and 8 bis, and their definitions are further explained in the ‘Elements of 
Crimes’, a set of guidelines adopted by the member States.88 
Article 12 (3) talks about acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to ‘a crime in 
question’. Despite the terminology which denotes a referral of a specific crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, the type of referral depicted under this provision has an analogous 
effect to a referral by State Parties or the Security Council. This is further clarified by Rule 44 
(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence which states that ad hoc acceptance of 
jurisdiction has the consequence of acceptance of all crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction.89 
On the same note, the Palestinian ad hoc declaration has the effect of granting jurisdiction 
to the Court on all crimes allegedly committed on the Palestine’s territory since 1 July 2002. 
That being so, there is ‘a reasonable base to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court’ have been committed by both parties to the conflict prior to and during Operation 
                                                          
86
   Art. 5, The ICC Statute. See also Werle G (2009) 84-5. 
87
   Preamble Par. 3 & 4, The ICC Statute.  
88
   International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes (2000). See also Werle G (2009) 84-5. 
89
   International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2002). 
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Cast Lead as concluded in the Goldstone Report90 and the publications of Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch.91 
2.4.2 Temporal Jurisdiction for the Palestinian Ad hoc Declaration 
 
According to Article 11 (1), for cases under the jurisdiction of the ICC, temporal jurisdiction 
(ratione temporis) starts from the date of entry into force of the Statute which is 1 July 
2002. For States which accede to the Statute at a later date than the date of entry into force 
of the Statute, the temporal jurisdiction runs from the date of accession as per the 
exception provided under the second paragraph of Article 11 and Article 126. 
The Palestine declaration is retroactive, as it specifies 1 July 2002 as the temporal scope. 
Even if the declaration happens to omit such a temporal scope, the ratione temporis that 
will be taken into consideration is the entry into force of the Statue.92 Hence, crimes 
allegedly committed posterior to 1 July 2002 could fall under the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Article 11 (2) read  with Article 24 (1) aims to exclude non-retroactive application of the 
Statute unless an act that occurred before the specified date has effect on events that 
occurred within the date mentioned in the declaration (consequential crimes).93 
With regard to the non-retroactive application of the Palestinian declaration, since the 
Statute cannot be retroactively applied to crimes committed before the coming into force of 
                                                          
90
   Par. 198-209 and 327-1549, Report of the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (2009).  
91
   Amnesty International ‘Operation Cast Lead: 22 Days of Death and Destruction (2009). Human Rights 
Watch ‘White Flag Deaths: Killings of Palestinian Civilians during Operation Cast Lead’ (2009). See also 
Pellet A ‘The Effects of Palestine’s Recognition of the ICC’s Jurisdiction’ in Meloni &Tognoni (eds) Is There a 
Court for Gaza? A Test Bench for International Justice (2012) 424. 
92
   Art. 11, The ICC Statute. See also The Office of The Prosecutor Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination 
(2013) 9. 
93
   For consequential crimes allegedly committed in Palestine, the ICC may follow the approach adopted by 
the ICTR and the ECHR on issues of ‘continuing crimes’. See Prosecutor v. Ngeze(1999) ICTR-97-27-I Par.3. 
Lovelace v. Canada, (1989) Communication no.196/1985 53. See Stahn, Mohamed & El Zeidy etal ‘The 
International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction Revisited’ (2005) 43 AJIL 99.Pursuant to Article 21 of the ICC 
Statute, precedents of other Courts or jurisdictions do not have the force of creating precedent for the 
Court, but they can be employed whenever found necessary. 
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the Statute, the declaration cannot also create the same effect. Even if investigations may 
expose crimes committed before the entry into force of the Statue (as it would probably 
happen in the Palestine case), it may not create a retroactive jurisdiction, as the approach 
adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Ugandan and the Cote D’Ivoire case clearly 
suggests.94 
If, however, crimes that date prior to 1 July 2002 are related to crimes within the temporal 
jurisdiction of the Court, the Court may consider the crimes to fall within its jurisdiction. As 
explicitly approved by the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) in the Nsengiyumva and Ngeze cases,95 this approach, also called ‘doctrine of 
continuing crimes’ may enable the ICC to address, the Israeli settlements96 and the Gaza 
blockade.97 
One may also raise the question whether a new Palestinian ad hoc declaration would 
provide the Court temporal jurisdiction starting from the date of the coming into force of 
the Rome Statute or only from 29 November 2012, the day the General Assembly granted 
Palestine observer State status.98 
 As concluded in the decision of the Pre-trial Chamber on the ad hoc declaration lodged by 
Cote D’Ivoire,99 an ad hoc declaration can grant the Court temporal jurisdiction as far back 
as 1 July 2002. However, if the Statehood of Palestine is considered to be derived from 
                                                          
94
   Pre-Trial Chamber III (2011)  Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire ICC-02/11-3 x 15. The Prosecutor v. Laurent 
Koudou Gbagbo(2013) ICC-02/11-01/11 OA 2. Judgment on the appeal of Mr Laurent Koudou Gbagbo 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on jurisdiction and stay of the proceedings. Warrant of Arrest 
for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended 27 September 2005. Pre-Trial Chamber II (2005) 
Situation in Uganda ICC-02/04-01/05. See also Zimmermann A (2013) 309. 
95
   Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva (2000) ICTR-96-12-I, par. 27-28. Prosecutor v. Ngeze (1999) ICTR-97-27-I Par.3 
96
   Par. 198, The Goldstone Report. 
97
   Par. 311-13, The Goldstone Report. See also Ashour I Does the Blockade of Gaza Constitute Genocide? 
(Unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2013). 
98
   UN Resolution 67/19 (2012). 
99
   Pre-Trial Chamber III (2011)(ICC-02/11-3), Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire. 
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Resolution 67/19, a new declaration cannot create a retroactive jurisdiction preceding the 
date Resolution 67/19 was adopted. This is due to the assumption that a Palestine State did 
not exist prior to the adoption of the Resolution.100 Hence, without the existence of a 
Palestinian State, Palestine is not considered to have any legal standing in the ICC. 
2.4.3 Territorial Scope of the Palestinian ad hoc Jurisdiction 
 
Essentially, the ICC functions on the basis of a delegated jurisdiction.101 Thus, it can only 
exercise jurisdiction to the extent of the territorial limit of the consenting State. In the case 
of ad hoc jurisdictions, however, the consenting State’s delegation is not exactly the same as 
a delegation from a signatory State. Unlike States Parties’ referrals, ad hoc declarations may 
appear with a specific reference to a certain territory.  
Contrary to other international instruments, the ICC Statute did not provide a specific 
provision with regard to territorial scope.102 During the stage of drafting, Denmark made 
declarations specifying that it does not intend the Statute to apply to its islands.103 The 
Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission Stated that such reservations, 
although constitute a modification of the legal effect of the Statute, are true and acceptable 
reservations.104 
Moreover, in approving the arrest warrant for the Lord’s Resistance Army Leaders, the Pre-
Trial Chamber used the term ‘Northern Uganda’ instead of ‘Uganda’.105 Similarly, when the 
Security Council made the Darfur referral through Resolution 1593 in 2005, it used the 
                                                          
100
   Ambos K ‘Palestine, UN Non-Member Observer Status and ICC Jurisdiction, available at 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/palestine-un-non-member-observer-status-and-icc-jurisdiction/ (accessed 10 
October 2014). 
101
   Kantorovich E ‘Israel/Palestine: The ICC’s Unchartered Territory’ (2013) 11 JICJ 983. 
102
   Triffterer O (ed) (2008) 557. 
103
   Triffterer O (ed) (2008) 557. The Reservations made by Denmark were later withdrawn in 2006. 
104
   Triffterer O (ed) (2008) 557. 
105
   Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended 27 September 2005, 
Pre-Trial Chamber II (2005) Situation in Uganda ICC-02/04-01/05. Triffterer O (ed) (2008) 557. 
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phrase ‘situation in Darfur’ instead of ‘situation in Sudan’.106 Thus, if territory specific 
referrals are acceptable for these situations, it could be argued that an accepting State 
should also be allowed to limit the effect of an ad hoc declaration to a specific territory 
while delegating jurisdictions to the Court or that the declaration should be able to be given 
a limited territorial effect.  
This, however, does not mean that territorial restrictions should be applied to the detriment 
of the Court’s effectiveness. As can be inferred from the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR),107 when a territorial restriction is obstructive, it may be held invalid, 
leaving intact the acceptance of jurisdiction. 
The Palestinian ad hoc acceptance of jurisdiction does not make a specific territorial 
declaration, but may be given an effect on a specific territory only.108 The declaration was 
made by the Palestinian Authority (PA), which is recognised as the de jure government of 
Palestine.109 This may result in establishing the jurisdiction of the Court over crimes 
committed in the Palestine territory which includes the West Bank, Gaza and Eastern 
Jerusalem.110 
However, the portion of the Palestine territory, including East Jerusalem and the West Bank 
settlements are under the occupation of Israel. Since occupation or de facto annexation 
                                                          
106
   UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005). 
107
   Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) ECHR Preliminary objections, series A, No. 310. 
108
   Meloni & Tognoni (eds) (2012) 424. 
109
   Meloni & Tognoni (eds) (2012) 424.The recent decision of the OTP on the ‘declaration’ made by Dr Morsi 
indicates that the entity making the declaration must have effective control over the territory and shall be 
considered as the ‘government of that State under international law. Since the situation in Egypt (a 
transition in government) is different from the situation in Palestine (Occupation), the effective control 
legal test employed in the case of Egypt cannot be applied to the case of the occupied Palestinian 
territories.  
110
   Art. IV Oslo Accords, Declaration of Principles on Interim self-Government Arrangements (1993). UN 
General Assembly Resolution 181(1947). 
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does not transfer territorial sovereignty to the occupying power,111 it could be argued that 
territorial sovereignty remains with Palestine, and hence the ad hoc declaration may 
comprise the Palestinian territories under the Israeli occupation.112 
Moreover, after the 2006 victory of Hamas in the Palestine parliamentary election and the 
consequent internal conflict with Fatah, the Palestinian Authority was split into two, giving 
rise to two governments, Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. 113  The international 
community only recognizes the government in the West Bank as the PA and as the official 
one.114 
Due to this, the Fatah ruled PA cannot validly lodge a declaration of acceptance which 
confers jurisdiction to the ICC over areas under the governance of Hamas without the 
latter’s consent. Thus, the PA’s consent to the jurisdiction of the Court could establish 
jurisdiction only on the areas where the PA has authority and territorial sovereignty, i.e., the 
West Bank.115  
2.4.4 Personal Jurisdiction of Ad hoc Declarations 
 
In accordance with Article 12 (2) (b), regardless of where the acts are perpetrated, the ICC 
exercises jurisdiction over nationals of a State Party who are accused of a crime. The Court 
has also competence to prosecute nationals of non-Party States on the following grounds: 1) 
In accordance with a decision of the Security Council (referral),116 2) If a national of a non-
                                                          
111
   Mendes E (1989) 23.Quigley J ‘The Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal Court: The 
Statehood Issue’ (2009) 35 Rutgers Law Record 4. 
112
   Mendes E (1989) 23.Quigley J (2009) 4. 
113
   Schanzer J Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine (2008) ch 9. 
114
   Schanzer J (2008) 143-7. 
115
   On August 23, 2014 Hamas has agreed with the proposal of the PA to sign the Rome Statute. Although this 
may have little to no significance to the 2009 declaration, it has significant contribution if Palestine wants 
to join the ICC or make a new ad hoc declaration. See Al-Muggrabi ‘Hamas backs Palestinian push for ICC 
Gaza war crimes probe’ Reuters 23 August 2014.  
116
   Art.13 (b), The ICC Statute. 
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Party State committed a crime in the territory of a State Party, 3) if a national of non-
member State to the ICC  committed a crime on the territory of another non-Party State 
that has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of a declaration pursuant to Article 12 (3) 
of the Statute or 4) If the nationals of a State lodging a declaration of acceptance committed 
crimes in the territory of other non-Party State, the Court enjoys jurisdiction over the 
nationals of the accepting State.117 
During the negotiations of the Rome Statute, the United States (US) argued that jurisdiction 
of the ICC over nationals of non-Party States without the consent of the national States 
would go against the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).118 It stated that 
according to the VCLT a treaty may not impose obligations on non-contracting States 
without their consent.119 Despite this argument, (described as ‘principal American legal 
objection to the ICC’)120 the ICC does not contain a provision that creates and imposes an 
obligation on non-Party States, as opposed to their nationals. It is undeniable, however, that 
the prosecution of their nationals may affect the non-Party State’s interest, but this cannot 
be equated with imposing obligation on the non-Party States.121 
On the ground of this ‘principal American legal objection’, the Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter,122 adopted Resolution 1422123 providing immunity to the 
nationals of non-Party States involved in UN established or authorised missions.124 
                                                          
117
   Art. 12(2) (a) & (3), 13, ICC Statute. 
118
   Akande D ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis 
and Limits’ (2003) 1 JICJ 620. 
119
   Art. 34, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 
120
   Akande D (2003) 620.In addition, on the basis of Article 98 agreements also named bilateral immunity 
agreements, over one hundred countries have agreed not to surrender US Citizens to the jurisdiction of 
the ICC.  
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   Akande D (2003) 620. 
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   Charter of the United Nations (1945). 
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   UN Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002). This Resolution was renewed by the SC as Resolution 1487 in 
2003. 
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Thus, with regard to the Palestine declaration, the personal jurisdiction of the Court will 
extend to nationals of Palestine and anyone who committed a crime on the territory on 
which the PA enjoys territorial sovereignty,125 but excluding nationals of non-Party States 
involved in UN established or authorised missions in Palestine, if any. 
2.5 The Status of the Entity Lodging the Ad hoc Declaration 
Article 12 (3) contemplates a ‘non-Party State’ to lodge an ad hoc declaration. The term 
‘non-Party State’ or ‘State’, however, is not defined in the ICC Statute. The authors of the 
Statute or any of the institutions of the Court were not faced with the necessity to interpret 
the term ‘non-Party State’. A similar issue was not also raised in the Cote D’Ivoire and 
Ugandan declarations. 
The controversial nature of the Palestine Statehood gave rise to the need to determine 
which entities are qualified to make an ad hoc declaration and what ‘non-Party State’ means 
for the purposes Article 12 (3) and for the purposes of the Statute in general. The decision of 
the Prosecutor on the Palestinian declaration mainly revolves around this issue. An in depth 
analysis of these issues is presented in the upcoming chapter. 
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   In addition to these Resolutions, on the basis of bilateral immunity agreements also named Article 98 
agreements, over one hundred countries have agreed not to surrender US Citizens to the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. 
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   Meloni &Tognoni (eds) (2012) 425. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR ON THE PALESTINE 
DECLARATION 
 
On 3 April 2012, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court published a 
decision on the Palestinian ad hoc declaration lodged to confer jurisdiction to the ICC.126 The 
decision, which was issued over three years after the declaration was submitted to the 
Registrar of the Court, stated that the OTP is unable to proceed with the investigation of the 
situation in Palestine. It indicates that the competence to decide the Statehood of Palestine 
does not rest with the Prosecutor of the Court, but with the Secretary General of the UN 
who may defer the decision to the UN General Assembly.127 
The OTP further indicated under paragraph six of the decision that it is up to the relevant 
bodies of the UN or the Assembly of the Rome Statute States Parties to decide whether or 
not Palestine is a State. As per the OTP, if this decision is made, Palestine may accede to the 
ICC Statute enabling the Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 12(1). More importantly, 
the last paragraph of the decision asserts that if the competent organs eventually settle the 
Statehood plea of Palestine or if the Security Council, as per Article 13 (b), refers the 
situation of Gaza to the Court, thereby establishing jurisdiction of the Court, the OTP could 
consider the allegations of war crimes committed in the Palestinian territories. 
Article 12 (3) of the ICC Statute is silent about which organ can make a decision of this 
nature. There is no procedure established to address issues similar to the one that arose 
with regard to the Palestinian ad hoc declaration. However, the OTP formulated a new 
                                                          
126
   The Decision of the Office of the Prosecutor, on the Situation in Palestine (2012) available http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-
836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf (accessed 29 September 2014). 
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   Par. 5, Decision of the OTP. 
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approach to decide the matter. This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the decision of 
the OTP and the main reason for rejecting the declaration which is the Statehood issue of 
Palestine. 
3.1 Decision of the Office of the Prosecutor 
The ICC Statute does not provide any procedural regime for Article 12(3) declarations. The 
procedure adopted for the first Article 12 (3) declaration made by Cote D’Ivoire, resembles 
the procedure provided for proprio motu prosecutions.128 However, issues similar to the 
issues raised in the Palestinian declaration were not raised in earlier ad hoc declarations. 
The Palestinian ad hoc declaration brought to the Prosecutor’s attention the absence of a 
clear pre-determined procedure for deciding whether a certain entity qualifies as a ‘State 
which is not a party to the Statute’ (as indicated under Article 12 (3)).129 
As can be understood from paragraph 4 of the OTP’s decision, the Prosecutor has 
approached lodging declarations pursuant to Article 12 (3) in the same way as depositing 
instruments for the purpose of Article 12 (1). This approach is further elaborated under 
paragraph 5 and 6 of the Prosecutor’s decision which reads as follows: 
‘The issue that arises, therefore, is who defines what a “State” is for the 
purpose of Article 12 of the Statute? In accordance with Article 125, the 
Rome Statute is open to accession by “all States”, and any State seeking to 
become a Party to the Statute must deposit an instrument of accession with 
the Secretary‐General of the United Nations. In instances where it is 
controversial or unclear whether an applicant constitutes a “State”, it is the 
practice of the Secretary‐General to follow or seek the General Assembly’s 
                                                          
128
   With regard to the Cote D’Ivoire situation, the Prosecutor first undertook a preliminary examination of the 
situation, as per Article 54 of the Statute, to determine if an investigation is warranted, and decided that 
there is a reasonable base to believe that crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction were committed. Following 
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directives on the matter. This is reflected in General Assembly Resolutions 
which provide indications of whether an applicant is a “State”. Thus, 
competence for determining the term “State” within the meaning of Article 
12 rests, in the first instance, with the United Nations Secretary General who, 
in case of doubt, will defer to the guidance of General Assembly. The 
Assembly of States Parties of the Rome Statute could also in due course 
decide to address the matter in accordance with Article 112(2) (g) of the 
Statute.‘ 
 
From this, the question that needs to be pondered is as to which organ of the Court can 
decide whether or not a given entity can accept the jurisdiction of the ICC. The question 
closely linked to this one is whether or not declarations under Article 12 (3) follow a uniform 
procedure akin to the determination of Statehood for accession or ratification of the 
Statute.  
3.2 Determination of Statehood for the Purpose of the ICC Jurisdiction  
Determination of Statehood for the purpose of the ICC could be made either for acceding or 
ratifying the Statue or for making an ad hoc declaration.  
3.2.1 Deciding Statehood for Accession or Ratification of the Statute 
 
The UN Secretary General has responsibility to receive and decide on ratifications or 
accessions to the ICC Statute.130 The ICC Statute has also determined who decides if an 
entity constitutes a ‘State Party’ as specified under Article 12 (1).131 
 A ‘State not a Party to the Statute’ becomes a ‘State Party’ when it deposits an instrument 
of accession or ratification to the Secretary General of the UN, who is the designated 
depository of the ICC Statute. In this case, the Secretary General, as provided under Article 
125 (2), decides whether that depositing entity can become a State Party, or defers the 
                                                          
130
   Art. 125 (2). The ICC Statute 
131
   Art. 125 (2).The ICC Statute. See also Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of 
Multilateral Treaties (1999) UN 8-9. 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
matter to the UN in case of doubt.132 As indicated in the UN General Assembly Resolution 
2166 (XXI),133 the Secretary General can, however, defer the matter to the UN General 
Assembly if a decision cannot be reached in accordance with the Vienna formula Stated 
under Article 81 and 83 of the VCLT.134 
3.2.2 Determination of Statehood for the Purpose of Article 12 (3) Declaration 
 
The rejection of the Palestinian declaration by the Prosecutor mainly rests on the 
consideration that the office lacks competence to decide the Statehood of the lodging 
entity. The ICC Statute does not expressly provide which organ has the power to decide the 
Statehood of an entity for the purposes of the Court. Through the possible interpretation of 
the Statute, one can, however, come up with four likely alternatives. 
a) Ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
The Pre-Trial division of the ICC is composed of at least six judges who are divided into 
various Pre-Trial Chambers.135 It may possibly be argued that the issue whether an entity 
qualifies to make an ad hoc declaration requires an interpretation of the word ‘State’ under 
Article 12 (3) of the Statute. Interpretation of the Statute necessitates a judicial 
determination on the meaning of the word ‘State’ by an independent panel of judges having 
the necessary expertise in the Rome Statute and the international law.136 Hence, it could be 
held that the Pre-Trial Chamber is best suited to serve this purpose. 
 
                                                          
132
   United Nations Conference on Law of treaties, Resolution 2166 (XXI) (1968).Summary of Practice of the 
Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties (1999) UN 23. 
133
   UN Resolution 2166 (XXI) (1968). 
134
   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty, (1969).Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as 
Depositary of Multilateral Treaties (1999) UN 22. 
135
   Art. 39 (1), The ICC Statute. 
136
   For the qualifications of the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber see ICC Discussion Paper by  Ingadottir T 
International Criminal Court Nomination and Election of Judges (2002). 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
b) Preliminary Ruling by the OTP  
As clearly provided under Article 12 (3), after being lodged to the registrar, ad hoc 
declarations are submitted to the Prosecutor so that the Prosecutor could make a 
preliminary ruling on the declaration as per the seriousness and the reasonability of the 
‘information received’ (proprio motu power of the Prosecutor).137 On this basis, it could be 
argued that the Prosecutor should first make a preliminary ruling on the status of the 
lodging entity. Then, as provided under Article 19 (3) he shall seek a prompt decision or a 
confirmation on his preliminary ruling from the Pre-Trial Chamber since the latter is 
empowered to address any question related to jurisdiction or admissibility. If the Prosecutor 
or the lodging entity disagrees with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s ruling, any of them can appeal 
to the Appeal Chamber as per Article 82 (1).  
c) Decision by the Assembly of States Parties 
Article 112 (2) of the Statute makes the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) responsible for the 
management, oversight and administration of the institutions of the Court. It further allows 
it to perform ‘any other functions consistent with the Statute or the Rules of Procedure’.138 
In addition, under Article 119 (2), the Assembly has the competence to settle disputes 
amongst States parties on issues of interpretation and/ or application of the Statute. Since 
the ASP is composed of sovereign political entities, it is possible to argue on the basis of the 
above provisions that it is within the purview of the ASP to make a political determination 
whether an entity qualifies to make an ad hoc declaration. 
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d) Decision by the UN Secretary 
The UN Secretary General is the depository of multilateral treaties, including the Rome 
Statue.139 It decides if an acceding entity qualifies to accede to a treaty in the capacity of a 
State. This possible alternative extends the depository power of the Secretary General and 
allows him to make a similar determination whether an entity qualifies to make an ad hoc 
declaration. 
The Prosecutor’s approach that either the UN Secretary General or the Assembly of States 
Parties decide on the issue is doubtful. The approach adopted by the Prosecutor treats ad 
hoc declarations in the same way as accessions. Despite the approach adopted, accession 
and ad hoc declarations are distinct.  
Accessions are deposited with the UN Secretary General, but letters of ad hoc declarations 
are to be lodged with the Registrar of the Court.140 When a State accedes to a multilateral 
treaty, it is accepting an international legal obligation on a permanent basis which 
necessitates a political and factual determination of the Statehood of the entity by the UN 
Secretary General. However, declarations pursuant to Article 12 (3) are temporary 
acceptances of jurisdiction mainly aimed to grant the Court an ad hoc delegation of 
jurisdiction. 
The question whether an entity can make a declaration as a ‘State which is not a party to 
the Statute’ involves interpretation of the Statute. Similar to accessions, ad hoc declarations 
entitle jurisdiction to the Court on territorial and personality grounds.141 A decision whether 
an entity qualifies to make Article 12 (3) declarations involves determination of the 
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existence of jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of the facts available.142 The question, 
therefore, is similar to a determination whether a certain territory falls under the Court’s 
jurisdiction or whether a certain individual is a national of the declaring State so as the Court 
could obtain jurisdiction. 
When a situation is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party or by the Security Council or 
by a non-Party State, the authority to decide on the initiation of investigation lies on the 
Prosecutor.143 The Prosecutor is empowered to analyse the seriousness of the information, 
to decide if there is a reasonable base to proceed with the investigation and to request 
authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chambers.144 In doing so, the Prosecutor evaluates the 
factual issues involved and, subsequently, seeks a ruling from the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
During the negotiation stage of the Statute, States required a mechanism to check the 
powers of the Prosecutor. Thus, for that purpose the Pre-Trial Chamber was created.145 The 
Pre-Trial Chamber is empowered to get involved in the investigation stage of any case.146 It 
can address challenges related to admissibility and jurisdiction either on the application of 
the Prosecutor or on its own motion.147 Hence, similar to other mechanisms to trigger 
jurisdiction, in matters that concern admissibility and jurisdiction of ad hoc declarations, the 
Prosecutor is required to seek the approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber.148 
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Thus, the most comprehensive procedure to determine if an entity qualifies as a State is the 
one that involves the Prosecutor and the Pre-trial Chamber, i.e., the Prosecutor first 
addresses whether Palestine qualifies as a ‘State which is not a party to the Statue’ on the 
basis of his proprio motu power and forwards his decision to the Pre-Trial Chamber for a 
confirmation ruling which is appealable to the Appeals Chamber. 
3.3 The Palestine Statehood Issue 
After identifying the organs of the ICC, which could hand down a decision on Statehood of 
Palestine for purpose of Art 12 (3), what then naturally follows is how to make such 
determination. This and the next section discuss the Statehood question of Palestine in two 
different approaches. 
In deciding on the 2009 Palestine ad hoc declaration, before reaching a conclusion, the 
Prosecutor seems not to have made an in depth analysis of the Palestine Statehood. This 
section, therefore, explores deeply the Palestine Statehood issue in light of the approach 
adopted by the Prosecutor (similar to accession or ratification of the Statute). 
In assessing the Statehood issue, the historical, legal and theoretical aspects of the 
Palestinian Statehood and State recognition are discussed. The criteria under the 
Montevideo Convention, the modern State practice for State recognition and other recent 
developments that may affect the Palestinian Statehood issue are also dealt with. 
The next section analyses the Statehood issue for the purposes of Article 12 (3). The analysis 
is made on the bases of the ICC Statute and conventional laws with the aim to reach at a 
conclusion whether or not Palestine fulfils the parameters of Statehood before its 
recognition as non-member Observer State of the UN General Assembly. 
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3.3.1 The Palestinian History in light of its Statehood Issue 
 
As discussed in the first chapter of this paper, after the First World War, the League of 
Nations placed the ancient Palestine land under the British mandate.149 The Covenant of the 
League of Nations stipulated that all mandates termed ‘Class A Mandates’, including the 
new Palestine, have provisional recognition of their existence as independent nations, but 
are required to stay subjected to the administrative assistance which shall be rendered by 
the mandate power.150 
Unable to cope up with the re occurring frictions in the mandate territory and the lack of 
support from its allies, the British notified the UN for termination of the mandate in a date 
no later than August 1948.151 The notification was followed by the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 181 (II) which approved a plan of partition that provided the partition of 
Palestine into an Arab and Jewish State.152 The partition plan was rejected by the Palestinian 
Arabs in the view that it allotted too much territory for the new Jewish State.153 The 
Resolution, however, had the effect of terminating the British mandate and provided the 
demarcation of boundaries between the two States154 
On May 1948, before the end of the British Mandate, the leaders of the Jewish community 
unilaterally declared the independence of Israel, which was followed by Israeli’s victory in 
the Arab-Israel war of 1948.155  Consequently, the Israeli army took control of part of the 
                                                          
149
   Dowty A (2008) 72. 
150
   Mendes E (1989) 6. 
151
   Withdrawal of forces from Palestine available at http://www.britishforcesinpalestine.org/withdrawal.html 
(accessed 29 September 2014). 
152
   Akasaka k The Question of Palestine and the United Nations (2008) 7. 
153
   Beinin & Hajjar(2003) 5. 
154
   Akasaka K (2008) 7. 
155
   Mendes E (1989) 7. See also Akasaka K (2008) 9. 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
area designated in the UN partition plan as the Arab State which resulted in the increment 
of the Israeli territory by almost 50 per cent.156 
In 1988 the Palestine National Council, the representative body of Palestine, declared the 
Statehood of Palestine.157 The declaration proclaimed the establishment of the independent 
State of Palestine in the land of Palestine. The same year the UN General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 43/177 which acknowledged the proclamation of the State of Palestine.158 It also 
decided that in the UN system, the designation ‘Palestine Liberation Organisation’ should be 
replaced by the designation ‘Palestine’.159 This Resolution gained 104 votes in favour, 44 
abstinences and two States, i.e., the US and Israel, voted against it.160 Following the 
declaration and the General Assembly Resolution, 89 States recognised Palestine in a short 
time period.161 
It must be noted that the declarations of independence made by the representatives of the 
Jewish and Palestine community in 1948 and 1988 respectively, were based on Resolution 
181 (II) which provided for the partition plan. Thus, the declarations of independence of 
both nations should be given the same recognition. In addition, the majority of the UN 
member States have treated Palestine as a State for a long time, and earlier Resolutions 
such as Resolution 181 (II), 43/177 and 3236162 are indicators to that effect. Palestine has 
also taken part in many Security Council sessions in which only States are allowed to take 
part. 
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In general, from the above historical facts one may assert that the Statehood of Palestine 
was confirmed through the League of Nations mandate, the 1947 Partition Plan, the 1988 
declaration of independence, the right to self-determination of the people and the 
recognition of the majority of States which is an indication of the State practice and Opinio 
Juris for the Statehood of Palestine. 
3.4.2 The Montevideo Criteria  
 
Although the international community’s landscape has been changing progressively, the 
State is still (but not the only) important component in international law. In international 
usage, the term State covers a broad range of entities, including those with minimal 
territory and population.163 However, despite being the critical component of international 
relations, the term has not been given a clear definition. In an attempt to come up with one 
comprehensive definition some authors emphasised territorial supremacy as a vital 
attribute of a State while others considered ‘self-containment’, sovereignty, independence 
and population.164 
The 1933 Montevideo Convention165 provides important criteria for Statehood.166Article 1 of 
the Convention stipulates four necessary qualifications for an entity to attain an 
international personality and therefore Statehood. The minimum standards required are: a 
permanent population, a defined territory and established government that have effective 
control and capacity to enter into diplomatic relations. Furthermore, Article 3 states that a 
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State may have a political existence independent from other States’ recognition. Thus, as 
per this Convention, despite the lack of recognition from other States, any entity which 
satisfies the above criteria qualifies as a State. 
The Montevideo Convention is the result of an agreement among Latin American nations. It 
may lack universal participation and international consensus at the time of adoption but has 
proved itself vital when it comes to determination of Statehood.167 However, if taken in 
their strictest sense the requirements set in the Convention may lack practicability in the 
contemporary world. Thus, the Convention must normally be interpreted in a way that can 
accommodate the established practices. For instance, the requirement of defined territory, 
if taken in the strictest sense, may go against the established practice in which various 
States with disputed territories and boundaries are recognised. The Israeli’s boundary, for 
instance, is undetermined or is not clearly set; yet, Israel is recognised by many States. 
Palestine does not need to have defined borders either. Rather, the borders will be the 
result of negotiations among the two parties. Notwithstanding the latter, the 1988 Palestine 
declaration of independence contemplated a new State of Palestine which essentially 
consists of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.168 Palestine 
also has a distinguishable population, which inhabited the territory for thousands of 
years.169 Therefore the first two criteria which are territory and population can be 
considered fulfilled with regard to Palestine. 
The third criterion is the existence of a government with effective control. This requirement, 
if taken in the strict sense, may also exclude those States which are under belligerent 
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occupation in which the occupying power takes control of the major powers of the 
government. It also excludes those entities which are exercising their external self-
determination rights. Contrary to these criteria, there are recognitions of certain entities as 
States even when they do no exercise full State authority or control. This is the case with 
Kosovo, Bosnia, and East Timor. 170 
From 1948-1967 Gaza and the West Bank were controlled by Egypt and Jordan respectively, 
and Israel took control of Gaza and the West Bank until it relinquished its control of the 
Gaza strip in 2006.171 Despite the presence of the occupation, as early as the declaration of 
Palestinian independence, the PLO chaired by Yasser Arafat functioned as the provisional 
government of Palestine.172 It provided basic social services and administrative functions. 
Since 2007, Hamas and Fatah were administering Gaza and West Bank, respectively, until 
they formed the new Palestinian unity government which was sworn in on June 2014.173 
The presence of the Israeli occupation, therefore, cannot exclude the Statehood of 
Palestine. To conclude that lack of effective government or the existence of occupation 
takes away a State’s sovereignty would mean that any sovereign State would cease to exist 
if it falls under belligerent occupation, contrary to what is witnessed in the case of Iraq 
under the US occupation and Kuwait under Saddam Hussein.174 
Capacity to enter into international relation is the last criterion of the Montevideo 
Convention. Capacity to enter into international relations is a capacity and an authority that 
a State exercises after it is established as a State. Hence, this criterion cannot be considered 
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as a prerequisite, rather a consequence of Statehood.175 Even if it is considered as a 
prerequisite of Statehood for the sake of argument, Palestine has concluded various 
bilateral and multilateral agreements which evidenced its capacity to enter into 
international relations. For instance, it signed the Oslo accords by virtue of the 
consideration that it has an international personality and the resultant treaty making power. 
It has also signed the Arab Charter on Human Rights, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Cultural Heritage Charter, and was a Party to 
bilateral treaties with France,176 Italy,177 Switzerland,178 Greece179 and the UK.180 In general, 
if the Montevideo criteria are interpreted contemporarily, Palestine can be considered as 
satisfying the Montevideo Statehood requirements.  
3.4.3 Palestine and the UN 
 
Modern State practice has inclined to the direction of State recognition by the international 
community, which mostly is reflected in the UN and its General Assembly Resolutions.181 
The UN General Assembly accorded observer status to Palestine in 1974 through Resolution 
3237 (XXIX) which enabled it to participate in General Assembly sessions, activities and 
conferences as an observer.182 Later in 1988 the General Assembly acknowledged the 
Palestine declaration of independence through Resolution 43/77 and approved that the 
declaration was made in line with Resolution 181 of 1947.183 A decade later, Resolution 
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52/250 provided Palestine the right to participate in agendas concerning the Middle East 
and Palestine.184 In 2011, however, Palestine’s application for full membership failed to get 
voted on by the UN Security Council, and did not reach the General Assembly owing to the 
warning of the US that it will veto the Resolution.185 
On 31 October 2011, Palestine was accepted to UNESCO as a full member.186 The PA’s 
application was endorsed by 107 votes in favour, 52 abstentions and 14 votes against it, 
making UNESCO the first UN body to grant full membership to Palestine.187 The accession is 
not only a vital diplomatic victory for the Palestinian Authority, but also one that influences 
the political and moral momentum for Palestinian’s recognition as a State. The 
overwhelming majority support of the UN member States witnessed in various UN 
Resolutions may be considered as a representation of the international community’s 
recognition of Palestine’s Statehood.  
Furthermore, Article 81 of VCLT,188 also called the Vienna formula, considers membership to 
any of the specialised agencies of the UN as an indication of the international personality of 
a State and equalises it to membership of the UN. Thus, it can be asserted that according to 
the Vienna formula Palestine has an international personality as a State. 
3.5 Arguments against the Palestinian Statehood 
Be this as it may, although a number of convincing reasons can be put forward in support of 
the Statehood of Palestine, there are arguments which are raised against the Palestine 
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Statehood. Analysing some of the repeatedly raised arguments is, therefore, considered 
necessary. 
In a law review article filed to the ICC regarding the existence of a Palestinian State, Ash189 
submitted arguments against the Statehood of Palestine. In his submission, one of the 
arguments he raised, which is the most often raised argument against Palestine’s 
Statehood, is that Palestinian leaders never openly admitted the existence of a Palestinian 
State.  This argument is followed by the assertion that since 1993 Palestinian leaders 
continued to engage in peace agreements and negotiations so as to establish an 
independent and sovereign Palestinian State, and thus there should not be any reason to 
ponder the matter further when the Palestinian officials themselves do not recognise a 
Palestinian State. 
Contrary to this assertion, Palestine, as discussed in section 3.3.1 above, has declared itself 
an independent State in 1988. The declaration was acknowledged by a UN General 
Assembly Resolution and was followed by recognitions by various States. The Palestinian 
Authority has also made an Article 12 (3) declaration to the ICC, which is considered to be 
made only by a State. Similarly, Palestine has made application for a full UN membership 
which is still pending in the UN. These acts can only be made by an ‘entity’ which considers 
itself to be a State. Moreover, the fact that political leaders of Palestine participate in 
negotiations and peace agreements to attain freedom from occupation and influence or to 
stop the re-occurring conflicts cannot be construed as an effort to gain sovereignty through 
negotiations or peace agreements. 
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It is also raised that key international institutions have failed to recognise Palestine as a 
State, thus Palestine lacks Statehood.190 State recognition as a principle is a political decision 
which can be made by sovereign States, and not by international institutions. Even if 
recognition of international institutions, for a matter of argument, is considered 
indispensable for State sovereignty, Palestine has been admitted into the UNESCO in 2012 
and was accredited a non-member observer State status in the UN General Assembly in 
November 2012. Needless to say, membership of the UN is not a requirement or a proof for 
the existence of a State, since Switzerland, for instance, was an internationally recognised 
State before it became the 190th member of the UN in 2002.191 
It is also argued that the Palestinians rejection of the UN partition plan is also a rejection of 
the UN grant of sovereignty over the designated land. One has to note that after Britain 
relinquished its mandate in 1948, the ‘sovereignty’ that the mandate power was holding in 
trust returned to the mandate territories, which, according to the UN partition plan, are the 
Arab State of Palestine and the Jewish State of Israel.  
The Palestinians rejected the UN partition plan in the view that the plan allotted too much 
land to the Jewish State.192 It is obvious that the UN Charter nowhere entitles the UN the 
power to grant sovereignty; hence the rejection of the UN partition plan can only indicate 
the Palestinians’ disagreement with the plan and not the rejection of a UN ‘granted’ 
sovereignty. 
It is also true that given the degree of the Israeli economy and military control, one may find 
it problematic to assert that Palestinian sovereignty exists in the controlled territory. Even in 
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areas where Israel relinquished control, Palestinians do not control their own airspace, 
coastline, land borders and are dependent on Israel for their basic needs.193 However, as 
discussed in the third section of this chapter, economic or/and military occupation cannot 
take away State sovereignty. 
 In addition, on December 2001, the contracting parties to the fourth Geneva Convention 
unanimously confirmed the applicability of the Convention on the Palestinian occupied 
territories.194  Under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions195 and Article 42 of the 
1907 Hague regulations,196 a situation of belligerent occupation is presumed to occur in the 
sense of occupation of the territory of a Sovereign State. Thus, if a sovereign nation was 
absent in the lands occupied by Israel, there would have been no issue of occupation. In 
confirmation of the Geneva rules, Israel has also announced its intention to apply the fourth 
Geneva Convention on the occupied territory.197 
3.6 The Palestine Statehood Issue for the Purposes of Article 12 (3) of the ICC Statute 
The discussion so far has shown that, contrary to the conclusion of the Prosecutor, there are 
indeed strong arguments for the Statehood of Palestine. However, accepting that the 
determination of the existence of a Palestine State remains a matter separate from 
determining whether an entity qualifies to be a ‘State Party’ to the Statute or not. Attention, 
therefore, lies in the question how the term ‘State’ is understood for the purposes of ad hoc 
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declarations, and whether the approach is different from the generally accepted practices of 
State recognition for the purpose of Article 12.  
The application of Article 12 (3) to entities the Statehood of which is doubted is problematic 
since it may result in the infringement of State sovereignty or acknowledgment of an entity 
which has not obtained international recognition or has not gained an international 
personality. At this juncture, it is important to note that, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in its advisory opinion in the ‘Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the 
UN’,198 answering whether the UN has the capacity to bring an international claim, stated 
that; 
‘[T]he subjects of the law … are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the 
extent of their right … the development of international law has been influenced 
by instances that give rise to … certain entities which are not States. But to 
achieve the ends (of the entities)… attribution of international personality is 
indispensable.’ 
 
This means that, although the scope and content of legal personality varies, there is no 
reason why the number of subjects shall not increase when the international legal order 
develops.199 This shall, therefore, be met by extending functional personality to entities 
leaving behind the curiosity about the true sovereignty of the entities.200 
The Tribunal for the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
also followed the ICJ’s functional approach. In the Maffezini vs. Spain case,201 the Tribunal 
stated; 
‘[M]odern international law conceives the State under the form of a variable 
geometic shape, whose outline depends on the subject at issue, and it relegates 
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it to the rank of general ‘notion’ whose interpretation depends ‘on the economy 
and the aims of the provisions’ within which it finds itself.’ 
 
According to these and many other case laws,202 interpretation of a provision should be 
governed by the concern for an improved human rights and humanitarian law protection 
which can be ensured through broad interpretation and implementation of the Statute. 
As any treaty, the Statute of the ICC shall be interpreted as per the rules set in the VCLT.  In 
dealing with treaty interpretation, Article 31 of the Convention states: ‘A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. Sub two of the same 
provision specifies that a Preamble is part of the context of any treaty. Therefore, Article 12 
(3) shall be interpreted in light of the object and purpose of the Rome Statute and the 
context set by the Preamble.203 Thus, despite being a soft law, due consideration ought to 
be given to the Preamble when a provision of the Statute is interpreted. 
Paragraph 3 of the Preamble of the ICC Statute contains the basis of international criminal 
law.204 The discipline, international criminal law, is aimed to protect the highest legal values 
of the international community against grave crimes that endanger the peace, security and 
well-being of the world. Triffterer205 states that the word ‘world’ found in paragraph 3 of the 
Preamble means more than mankind, or humanity, and includes the well-being of the world 
in general. This concept has also been crystallised by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Tribunal specified that the essence of the whole body of 
                                                          
202
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204
   Triffterer O (2008) 8-10. 
205
   Triffterer O (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the international criminal Court-observers’ Notes, 
Articles by Article (2 ed) (2008) 9. 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
international human rights and humanitarian law rests in the protection of every human 
person.206 
Paragraph 4 of the ICC Preamble further asserts the aim of the international community to 
fight the culture of impunity by prosecuting those responsible for the ‘most serious crimes’. 
Paragraph 5 calls for the need to end impunity by creating an effective enforcement 
mechanism which contributes to the prevention of such grave crimes by creating awareness 
and showing potential offenders that impunity shall not prevail.207 
In its founding Tadic judgment,208 the ICTY has also opted for a broad teleological 
interpretation. It stated; 
[A]narrow concept of jurisdiction may, perhaps, be warranted in a national 
context but not in international law. International law, because it lacks a 
centralized structure, does not provide for an integrated judicial system 
operating an orderly division of labour among a number of Tribunals, where 
certain aspects or components of jurisdiction as a power could be centralized or 
vested in one of them but not the others. In international law, every Tribunal is a 
self-contained system. This is incompatible with a narrow concept of jurisdiction, 
which presupposes a certain division of labour. Of course, the constitutive 
instrument of an International Tribunal can limit some of its jurisdictional 
powers, but only to the extent to which such limitation does not jeopardize its 
‘judicial character’, … Such limitations cannot, however, be presumed and, in any 
case, they cannot be deduced from the concept of jurisdiction itself.’ 
 
 
Article 12 (3) shall, therefore, be interpreted so as to include a wide arena in which the 
grave crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction may be committed.209 It should be read in a way 
that does not allow the existence of an impunity zone in which perpetrators enjoy immunity 
from prosecution. It is true that if the broadest and the most inclusive meaning is given to 
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the word ‘State’ it may be construed as a recognition of an entity as a State, but it also limits 
the object and purpose of the Statue if a strict and narrow definition is given to the term. 
Therefore, balancing the two necessities deems necessary so as to reach at a sound 
interpretation of the provision. 
When faced with two possible interpretation alternates, i.e., narrow and broad, the object 
and purpose of the treaty and good faith demands that the interpretation which must be 
opted for should be the one that enables a treaty to have the most appropriate effect.210 
The ICC is a State based organ.  It is only States which can be parties to the Statute, but the 
crimes listed under Article 5 and the elements of crimes are meant to create individual 
criminal responsibility. The Statute is drafted and applied with the aim to make individual 
perpetrators responsible.  Due to this, the application of any of the provisions of the Statute 
should not be perceived to have or to reflect the political stand of the States parties or the 
ICC in general. The Court is neither a political organ nor one established for that purpose. 
The decisions of any of the organs of the Court should not be attributed to anything but the 
object and purpose of the treaty.  
Therefore, when interpreting Article 12 (3), particularly the word ‘State’, the focus should lie 
on which approach serves the object and purpose of the Statute not the connotation the 
interpretation and the consequent application of the provision might have. As a result, and 
for the reasons mentioned above, Palestine can be characterised as a State and could be 
considered as satisfying the requirements of Statehood for the objects and purposes of 
Article 12(3). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Due to the endless character of the conflict, the Israel-Palestine conflict is a permanent 
fixture in the international news media. Although the Palestinian ad hoc declaration and the 
later decision of the Prosecutor on the declaration were made in 2009 and 2012 
respectively, discussions and debates on Palestine and the ICC persist to the present day. 
This chapter discusses the non-member Observer Status of Palestine and its effect on the 
2009 Palestine ad hoc declaration.  It examines whether or not the observer State status of 
Palestine would retroactively validate the ad hoc declaration previously held invalid by the 
OTP. After the recent Israeli military operation, Operation Protective Edge, discussion of 
accountability measures has intensified like never before. Therefore, providing a discussion 
of this operation deems necessary. Following the discussion about the recent Operation, the 
last section forwards a way forward, focusing on the necessary measures that must be taken 
to establish criminal responsibility against the perpetrators of gross crimes. 
4.1 The Non-Member Observer State Status of Palestine and Issues of Retroactivity 
On November 2012, the 67th session of the UN General Assembly accorded Palestine a non- 
Member Observer State status through Resolution 67/19.211 The Resolution was adopted by 
138 votes in favour, nine against and 41 abstinences.212 One may argue whether this 
General Assembly Resolution is a nomenclature merely meant for the purposes of the UN or 
a general recognition of the Statehood of Palestine.  
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The General Assembly is empowered to make recommendations to promote peaceful 
adjustment of situations. However, as can be understood from Chapter 4 of the UN 
Charter,213 it is not empowered to provide State recognition.214 A General Assembly 
Resolution cannot confer Statehood to an entity, but this is not to mean that such symbolic, 
declarative Resolutions do not display the opinion of the international community and the 
constituent sovereign States. 
Paragraph 8 of the Prosecutor’s decision indicates that the crimes allegedly committed in 
Palestine will be ‘considered’ by his office if ‘competent organs of the UN’ settle the 
‘relevant issue’, i.e., the Statehood issue of Palestine. As the recent Statements of the ICC 
disclose, the OTP has considered the Resolution as settling ‘the relevant issue’.215 If the new 
status of Palestine satisfies the pre-condition set by the Prosecutor under paragraph 8 of the 
decision, one may wonder if the PA needs to lodge a new Article 12 (3) declaration or if the 
Prosecutor could, on the basis of the 2009 ad hoc declaration, investigate the situation in 
Palestine starting from 1 July 2002. 
In the 2013 report on the preliminary examination activities of the Court, the OTP Stated 
that the upgraded status of Palestine, as per the examinations of the office, cannot 
retroactively cure the previous invalid declaration which was lodged without having any 
standing on the Court.216 Leaving aside the argument for validity of the declaration 
discussed throughout this chapter, on the basis of the premise provided by the OTP, the 
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new standing of Palestine is a status supposedly derived from Resolution 67/19 which 
changes the status of Palestine only ex nunc.217 Since the General Assembly, while adopting 
the Resolution, did not address the Palestinian Statehood issue with regard to the period 
prior to November 2012, the Resolution cannot be held to have a retroactive effect. 
4.2 Operation Protective Edge 
After Operation Cast Lead, the most recent and unprecedented military offensive against 
Gaza was conducted by Israel. The operation named Operation Protective Edge was the 
result of consecutive events. On 12 June 2014, three Israeli teenagers were abducted and 
later killed; Israel accused Hamas for the abduction and murder of the teens and conducted 
an intensive investigation which involved widespread detentions and home searches; on 2 
July 2014, a Palestinian teen was abducted and killed which resulted in violent Palestinian 
demonstrations and an escalation of rockets fired into Israel.218 Similar to Operation Cast 
Lead, Israel justified this operation on the basis of self-defence from the escalating rockets 
launched from Gaza to the Southern Israel.219 
‘Protective Edge’ started on 8 July 2014 and ended in an open cease-fire on 26 August 2014.  
The operation involved aerial bombardment, artillery fire and naval shelling and caused 2, 
134 fatalities including 1, 473 civilians and 501 children, leaving 18, 000 homeless and 
resulting in 110, 000 internally displaced people.220   Hamas fired 3, 659 rockets among 
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which 735 rockets were obstructed by Israel’s Iron Dome defence system and 224 hit built-
up areas, killing six civilian.221 
4.2.1 The Reaction of the UN Human Rights Council 
 
Due to this operation, on 23 July 2014, the UN Human Rights Council has established a new 
commission of inquiry chaired by professor William Schabas. The commission, also called 
Goldstone 2.0, is mandated to investigate violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the Gaza Strip in the context of 
the military operation.222 At the time of writing, the Commission was on the verge of 
starting its investigation into the situation. 
4.3 The Way forward 
‘Going back to the status quo ante won’t solve the problem; it will only defer it 
for another day. It will not stop the bloodshed, it will make it even worse the 
next time the cycle rolls over the people of Gaza and plagues the people of 
Israel. Gaza is an open wound and Band Aids won’t help. There must be a plan 
after the aftermath that allows Gaza to breathe and heal.’223 
 
 
This Statement was made by the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, on 21 July 2014 
amidst the 50 days Israeli military operation in Gaza. As discussed in the second section of 
this chapter, this military offensive gathered a vast attention and once again brought to the 
forefront discussions on the mechanisms to bring those responsible to justice and to provide 
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redress to the victims.  Various commentaries and media reports called on the ICC to open 
preliminary investigation.224 
In a Statement released on 2 September 2014, the Prosecutor of the ICC stated that for lack 
of jurisdiction ‘the alleged crimes committed in Palestine are beyond the legal reach of the 
Court’ and that her office is devoid of any legal basis to proceed with any preliminary 
investigations into the situation.225 Earlier in 2013, the office, in its yearly publication, has 
made it clear that since the door to activate the 2009 declaration is closed, the Prosecutor is 
waiting on the Palestinian government to make the necessary move.226 
Although the Palestinian government has signed various international treaties and 
Conventions after Palestine gained the new status in the UN,227 to date the government has 
not signed the Rome Statute. The government was urged by many, including the Prosecutor 
of the ICC, to sign the Statute of the Court or to lodge a new ad hoc declaration to the 
Registrar of the Court, but it failed to do so.228 
During the past 20 years, the Israel-Palestine conflict has resulted in countless peace 
settlements and negotiations which brought neither peace nor justice to this vicious cycle of 
conflicts. The widespread impunity for the crimes committed in the conflict has furthered 
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abuses and violations of human rights and humanitarian law. However, Israel and USA stress 
that seeking international criminal responsibility through the instrumentality of the ICC for 
the alleged crimes committed in the conflict would utterly undermine the peace process.229 
This assertion is not only made by Israel and the USA which are non-Party States to the ICC, 
but also by certain States Parties, particularly the UK, France, Italy and Canada, which were 
seeking for universal ratification of the ICC Statute during the negotiations of the Rome 
Statute.230 
Resorting to the ICC does not only change the political calculus of the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, but it will also see into the ways both parties conduct the armed conflict. It will 
assess Israel’s usual assertion that it does not target civilians and civilian objects, and the 
allegation that Hamas and Hamas affiliated armed groups employ human shields to conduct 
their attacks against Israel.231 
Undeniably, there is an immense politics involved in the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, 
despite the political pressure involved, the Palestine government should resort to the ICC 
instead of using the idea of joining the ICC as a ‘bargaining chip’ in the peace 
negotiations.232 In the Palestine case, resorting to the ICC could take one of the following 
forms; signing the Statute or lodging a new ad hoc declaration or signing the Statute and 
lodging a new ad hoc declaration simultaneously. 
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If Palestine accedes to the Rome Statute, the Court would enjoy jurisdiction over crimes 
allegedly committed after the date Palestine became a State Party to the Statute. This 
means that the Court would not have jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed in 
Palestine up to the date of accession, but only over crimes that would be committed in the 
future. 
Nonetheless, if Palestine lodges a new ad hoc declaration, the Court would have jurisdiction 
to prosecute the alleged crimes starting from the date the UN General Assembly granted 
Palestine a non-member observer State status. This is unless the Prosecutor, miraculously, 
accepts the existence of a State of Palestine before Resolution 67/19 was adopted, which 
would create a retroactive jurisdiction as far back as 1 July 2002. 
Alternatively, as provided under Article 15 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor may initiate 
a proprio motu investigation on her own right or the Security Council may refer the situation 
in Palestine to the Prosecutor. Notwithstanding the latter two alternatives which may or 
may not come about, the Palestine Government should sign the ICC Statute and lodge an ad 
hoc declaration so as to benefit from the different temporal jurisdictions the two legal 
actions give rise to. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
5.1 Conclusion 
The debate of a possible ICC intervention comes up each time the Israel-Palestine conflict 
breaks out.  In the centre of this debate lies the question of acceptance of ICC jurisdiction. 
As both Parties to the conflict are not member States to the ICC, in 2009 the Palestinian 
government submitted an ad hoc declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC so that 
the Court could exercise an ad hoc jurisdiction over the situation in Palestine. 
The Palestinian ad hoc declaration can be held to have met all conditions necessary for the 
Court to exercise jurisdiction as per Article 12 and 13 of the Statute. The declaration can be 
held to have met all elements of jurisdiction; 
- Subject matter jurisdiction: the Goldstone report and the publications of Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch indicate crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court were committed in the territory of the declaring State. 
- Temporal Jurisdiction: on the basis of Article 11 of the Statue and the decision of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber on the declaration of Cote D’Ivoire, the temporal scope could 
cover crimes allegedly committed after 1 July 2002 up to any prospective time. 
- Territorial jurisdiction: Since the PA did not obtain the agreement of Hamas while 
submitting the ad hoc declaration, only the areas where the PA has territorial 
sovereignty fall under the Court’s jurisdiction. 
- Personal jurisdiction: individuals who allegedly committed crimes within the 
territorial jurisdiction mentioned above minus nationals of non-Party States involved 
in UN established or authorised missions in Palestine, if any. 
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Three years after the Palestinian ad hoc declaration was submitted to the Registrar of the 
Court, the then Chief Prosecutor of the ICC rejected the Palestinian declaration stating that 
it is not within the competence of his office, but within the competence of the Assembly of 
State Parties of the ICC and the UN General Assembly to determine the Statehood of 
Palestine.  
The decision of the Prosecutor is questionable due to its failure to analyse the legal and 
historical aspects of the Palestine Statehood, as well as due to the approach adopted and 
the organs chosen to determine the issue. 
Contrary to the decision of the Prosecutor the Statehood of Palestine has legal and historical 
support. Palestine has existed as a State under international law since the time the Ottoman 
Empire relinquished its control over the historical land of Palestine and the designation of 
the same land as a class A mandate in the League of Nations mandate system. Palestine’s 
Statehood was later confirmed by the 1988 declaration of Statehood and subsequently 
acknowledged by the UN General Assembly Resolution. The recognition of Palestine by over 
one hundred States, the bilateral and multilateral treaties which it is a party to and its 
membership in the UNESCO are also supporting facts to the Statehood of Palestine. 
Despite the approach adopted by the Prosecutor in deciding the Palestinian ad hoc 
declaration, interpretation of Statehood for the purpose of lodging an ad hoc declaration to 
accept the jurisdiction of the ICC is not the same as the interpretation of the term for the 
purpose of accession to the Statute.  As provided in the Vienna Convention, interpretation 
of a term in the Statute should be made in light of the object and purpose of the Statute.  
The decision of the Prosecutor did not, however, differentiate between the two necessarily 
distinct interpretations of a ‘State’. In addition, the Prosecutor in his decision indicated that 
the determination of this legal and factual questions fall within the competence of the UN 
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General Assembly and the Assembly of States Parties. The interpretation of the word ‘State’ 
involves an interpretation of the Statute in light of the object and purpose of the Statue and 
an assessment of international law. The Prosecutor has employed a questionable approach 
when he forwarded the determination of this legal and factual question to be made by a 
political body outside the organs of the Court when, in fact, there is an organ within the 
institution of the Court equipped with international law expertise and authorised by the 
Statute to address issues related to admissibility and jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the Statehood of Palestine is no more controversial after the adoption of 
Resolution 67/19 which granted Palestine a non- member observer State status in 2012. 
Although the Resolution may not validate the previously rejected ad hoc declaration, it has 
enabled Palestine to make a new ad hoc declaration or to accede to the Statute without 
posing issues of validity similar to the ones raised before. 
5.2 Recommendations 
5.2.1 With Regards to the ICC 
 
Article 12 (3) was one of the most inconspicuous provisions in the Rome Statute. However, 
the provision attracted attention due to the absence of a clear procedure to interpret and 
apply the provision. This lacuna could only be filled if the provision is interpreted and made 
applicable in a manner that addresses the intent of the drafters and the very object and 
purpose of the Statute.  
The Court should also push for universal application of the Statute by using all the available 
arenas. Although international criminal responsibility may not be an answer to the diverse 
problems of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, it will have a deterring effect with regard to the 
ways both parties to the conflict conduct the armed conflict. It is true that hard cases make 
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bad laws, hence, the Palestine case should be approached in a manner that could enable 
consistence application of the Statute in future cases outside the context of the Israel-
Palestine conflict. 
5.2.2 Recourse to Universal Jurisdiction 
 
Given the inability and unwillingness of the Israeli and Palestinian Courts to prosecute the 
alleged crimes and considering the lack of jurisdiction of the ICC, universal jurisdiction can 
also be considered as a possible alternate to secure accountability for crimes committed in 
the conflict. Thus, States Parties to the Geneva Conventions could initiate criminal 
prosecutions in their respective national Courts where there exists adequate evidence for 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
5.2.3 Criminal Accountability for Sustainable Peace 
 
Justice and rule of law are pre-requisites to a sustainable peace. The widespread impunity 
for crimes committed in the region has stimulated the commission of more crimes. 
Therefore, States Parties to the ICC Statute, especially, should push for the establishment of 
national or international criminal responsibility in the peace settlements and negotiations so 
as to achieve a sustainable peace in the region. 
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